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GoverninG reliGious Multiplicity
The Ambivalence of Christian-Muslim Public Presences  
in Post-colonial Tanzania
Hansjörg Dilger 
Abstract: In post-colonial Tanzania, efforts to govern the relations 
between Christianity and Islam—the country’s largest religions—have 
been impacted by the growing potential for conflict between and among 
diverse strands of the two faiths from the mid-1990s onward. They have 
also been shaped by the highly unequal relations between various Chris-
tian and Muslim actors and the Tanzanian government in the context 
of globalization. This article describes how the governance of religious 
multiplicity in Tanzania has affected the domains of transnational devel-
opment, the registration of new religious bodies, and the regulation of 
religious instruction in schools. It argues that a comprehensive under-
standing of ‘lived religion’ needs to focus on the way in which religious 
multiplicities are molded as socio-cultural realities through a wide range 
of governing interventions.
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Religious diversity and difference have gained a new public presence in Tan-
zania since the 1990s. In particular, individuals and organizations from the 
former mission churches and the neo-Pentecostal and Muslim ‘revivalist’ fields 
have established new educational institutions.1 These combine secular educa-
tion with instruction in moral values and have expanded Tanzania’s educa-
tional marketplace significantly (Dilger 2017; Dohrn 2014; Stambach 2010). 
Simultaneously, these recent educational interventions—along with some Mus-
lim and Christian revivalist actors’ health-related initiatives (Dilger 2014) and 
other socio-political measures (Loimeier 2007)—have become embedded in the 
more comprehensive transformation of Tanzania’s cityscapes through multiple 
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religious materialities, practices, and aspirations. The various dynamics of 
‘claiming territory’ (Dilger 2014) that these configurations engender not only 
evoke among the involved actors a new sense of affective possibility to mold 
public space according to their own aspirations. They also arouse sensations of 
uncertainty and competition among a wide range of local, national, and trans-
national stakeholders in the country’s “religiously super-diverse” (Becci et al. 
2017: 79) cityscapes, where these various dynamics have become most palpable 
(Dilger 2017: 518).
In this text, I describe how the growing material and immaterial public pres-
ences of Christian and Muslim actors in Tanzania has been co-shaped by gov-
erning bodies’ efforts to ‘order’ Tanzania’s highly diverse religious life-worlds.2 
I show that this process of ‘ordering’ (cf. Benda-Beckmann and Pirie 2007), 
which aims to (re)gain control over the complexities and volatilities of multi-
religious configurations in public and institutional settings, occurs especially 
on the level of national and transnational governance, and often in irregular 
and ambivalent ways. I also demonstrate that the governing of religious mul-
tiplicity in Tanzania has to be understood with regard to the country’s post-
colonial histories of Christianity and Islam, which have shaped religious actors’ 
unequal structural positions toward the state and transnational governing bod-
ies up to the present day.3 
In conclusion, I argue that the comparative study of Christian and Muslim 
life-worlds—which so far has mainly explored individual encounters, experi-
ences, and practices—should also address the complex processes of “politics 
and power” (Soares 2016: 679) that configure various religious traditions in 
relation to each other as distinct public and societal realities. I suggest that the 
study of religious multiplicity in public settings should focus not only on the 
convergences and divergences of these processes, but also on how religious 
material and immaterial presences are produced and regulated in public spaces 
under specific socio-political conditions (cf. Altglas and Wood 2018: 27) and in 
often highly unequal ways.
Between Facilitation and Containment: ‘Ordering’ Religious  
Multiplicity in Tanzania 
The public presence of different religious groups and their ideological aspira-
tions in post-colonial Tanzania are governed primarily through national and 
transnational interventions that foster—or contain and regulate—the country’s 
multiplicity of religious practices, desires, and institutional configurations. 
From the mid-1980s onward, structural reforms and market liberalization mea-
sures, driven heavily by the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund, 
led to a growing presence of religious voices, practices, and actors, especially in 
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the cities. In Dar es Salaam, media engagement (Ng’atigwa 2013: 150), activist 
involvement (Loimeier 2007), and the formation of civil society initiatives (Dil-
ger 2014) enhanced the omnipresence of a wide range of Christian and Muslim 
im/materialities beyond the two religions’ historically established strands. At 
the same time, these dynamics also instigated tension and conflict across the 
two religious fields (Wijsen and Mfumbusa 2004) and within them (Dilger 
2014: 56; Loimeier 2007), thus revealing the growing ambivalence of Tanza-
nia’s deregulated multi-religious landscapes. In subsequent years, the national 
government’s approach to ordering has oscillated between the facilitation of 
religious diversity, on the one hand, and the maintenance and restoration 
of this multiplicity’s internal equilibrium for the sake of ‘national cohesion’ 
(Ng’atigwa 2013), on the other.
Following Tanzania’s transition to a multi-party democracy in 1995, gov-
ernment approaches to ordering religious multiplicity in public spaces have 
focused explicitly on the egalitarian treatment of Islam and Christianity. In 
line with the former socialist Ujamaa (‘familyhood’, ‘community’ in Kiswahili) 
ideology, governments have evoked the value of national unity and claimed 
to counteract any form of discrimination based on religious, ethnic, or social 
difference. In the field of inter-religious relations, such efforts have become 
manifest in the careful balancing of the public appearance of government 
representatives at Christian and Muslim events, as well as the strict obser-
vance of the presidents’ alternating religious affiliations since 1995. Further-
more, religious neutrality in post-independent Tanzania has motivated the 
decision not to include ‘religion’ as a category in the national census “on the 
grounds that [statistics on religious affiliation] were politically sensitive and 
could undermine national unity and security” (Ndaluka 2012: 2). However, 
while the Tanzanian state has sought to establish order by not interfering in 
the religious field at all, it was exactly these politics of neutrality that sparked 
strong criticism—especially from revivalist Sunni groups. With regard to the 
aspect of religious demographics, for instance, they accused the government of 
hiding the ‘true’ numbers of Muslims in the country (Loimeier 2007: 148–149).
The Tanzanian governments’ claim of being ‘religiously neutral’ has been 
subverted further by some of the political interventions undertaken in the 
multi-religious field since the 1990s. In 1992, the former mission churches’ 
position was strengthened by establishing the Christian Social Services Com-
mission (CSSC) as part of a Memorandum of Understanding between the Tan-
zanian state and international development organizations. Since then, the 
CSSC has facilitated the implementation of educational and health-related 
initiatives, and it has simultaneously become the target of Muslim revivalists 
calling out the state’s alleged religious bias. From the 2000s onward, (trans-)
national development interventions were partly more neutral with regard 
to religious organizations.4 However, the Christian schools have especially 
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benefited from World Bank–funded programs aimed at establishing universal 
access to primary and secondary schooling since then. These programs have 
effectuated the rapid scaling up of the state education sector and the steep 
decline of its overall quality, while simultaneously stimulating a boom in the 
new Christian schools, which had not been the original target of the World Bank 
programs (Dilger 2013). 
The hierarchies within this newly configured educational market are clearly 
reflected in the annual school rankings of the Tanzania National Institute 
of Education. Christian schools in particular have figured disproportionally 
high in the secondary level rankings since the early 2010s, thereby surpassing 
both government schools and the even weaker Islamic schools.5 However, the 
emerging picture is not as straightforward as it may seem at first sight, as the 
schools of the Turkish Sufi-inspired Gülen movement have ranked at the very 
top for many years (Dohrn 2014: 242). Furthermore, the newly established hier-
archies in the educational marketplace are closely entwined with the dynamics 
of social stratification since most Christian schools depend in part on very high 
fees, thereby subverting the CSSC’s state-supported agenda of serving “the 
poor” (Dilger 2013: 455).
The unequal effects of governing Tanzania’s multi-religious fields have also 
become palpable with regard to the state’s power to (de)register civil society 
organizations. Historically, this concerns especially the dissolution of the East 
African Muslim Welfare Society (EAMWS)6 and its replacement by the state 
in 1968 with BAKWATA. Muslim revivalists still claim that this incidence has 
become emblematic of the post-colonial state’s alleged discrimination against 
Muslims, and they accuse BAKWATA of being a government organization 
(Loimeier 2007: 141–143). Such sentiments of injustice have been exacer-
bated by Muslim activist perceptions of state politics in the wake of 9/11 
and the bomb attacks on the US embassies in Dar es Salaam and Nairobi in 
1998. However, although several Muslim (especially revivalist) organizations 
became subject to state scrutiny during these years, and have partly suffered 
due to the throttling of funds from Kuwait and the Arab world since then, they 
are not the exclusive target of government checks. 
My survey of records from the Ministry of Home Affairs (MoHA) and registra-
tion books from the Registration Insolvency and Trusteeship Agency showed that 
between 1980 and 2009 there was indeed a significantly higher number of regis-
tered Christian organizations compared to Muslim ones (1,286 Christian versus 
696 Muslim). However, there was also a noticeable difference in the number of 
rejected or revoked religious organizations in the years 2000–2002: 2 Muslim 
organizations compared to 24 Christian ones. Furthermore, it was especially 
Christian organizations whose registration process was marked ‘open’ in the 
MoHA books after 1999 (397 Christian versus 28 Muslim until 2009), thereby 
hinting at their continued vetting through the MoHA. Most of these open case 
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files originated from the neo-Pentecostal spectrum, whose organizations were 
often scrutinized due to their international networks and funding flows, as well 
as the concerns of MoHA employees that not all of them were ‘real’. The results 
of my survey thus contradicted the Muslim revivalist claims that they were 
exposed to state scrutiny more rigidly than Christian actors and groups. 
Finally, the governing of religious diversity applies to the topic of religious 
instruction in Tanzania’s public and private schools. The teaching of dini (reli-
gion) on all educational levels in both sectors may involve singing, praying, or 
learning from the religious scriptures in faith-segregated groups. In addition, 
religious instruction on the secondary level is taught especially in faith-oriented 
schools through the subjects of Islamic Knowledge, Bible Knowledge (O-Level), 
and Divinity (A-Level). In all these instances, there exists no state-approved 
curriculum for these subjects, which are examined through the National Exam-
inations Council of Tanzania (NECTA). 
In 2005, the Ministry of Education and Culture announced the standardiza-
tion of religious instruction and the introduction of an additional, compulsory 
subject entitled Religion and Ethics. In the same year, the Ministry led a study 
tour to Uganda for Tanzanian representatives, where a curriculum of teaching 
religion and ethics had been introduced earlier. In 2008, the Tanzania Institute 
of Education released two guidelines for the preparation of syllabi for religious 
education drafted by Christian and Muslim representatives. However, Muslim 
revivalists complained heavily that throughout this process the “Islamic side” 
had been represented exclusively by BAKWATA. They also claimed that the 
inclusion of ethics in religious instruction would “mix up” the writings of the 
Bible and Qur’an, and that religious instruction would become an “academic” 
subject—like, for instance, geography—instead of allowing for “teaching reli-
gion” and “faith in God.” Against the background of this ongoing dispute, I 
asked an employee of the Ministry of Education and Vocational Training in 
2010 how exams for religious instruction were prepared without a binding cur-
riculum. She shrugged and said: “Even the employees of NECTA say, ‘We are 
just doing it.’”
Perspectives
States in the Global South have often been regarded—both in academic 
research and politics—as a “source of instability” (Benda-Beckmann and Pirie 
2007: 2), thereby echoing the image of the “weak or retreating state” (ibid.: 
4) in the context of neo-liberal reform processes (ibid.: 5). In contrast to such 
a scenario, various state agents in Tanzania have in fact taken center stage in 
accommodating religious multiplicity in public and institutional settings from 
the 1990s onward—partly under the pressure of, partly in close alliance with, 
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civil society and transnational development organizations. Despite the state’s 
claim to be religiously neutral in such interventions, today’s multi-religious 
institutional and ideological public landscapes are shaped by inter- and intra-
religious inequalities and affective tensions that are tied closely to the long-
standing post-colonial histories of Christianity and Islam in the country. They 
are also molded by inner-African and transcontinental connections and flows 
of resources that have diversified both the Christian and Muslim presences in 
public life (Dilger 2013; Stambach 2010), as well as the way that the Tanzanian 
state has regulated emerging multi-religious configurations in public spaces, 
from the 1990s onward. 
In conclusion, the Tanzanian case shows that the comparative focus on the 
governing of Christian and Muslim presences in public settings reveals partly 
diverging and partly similar trajectories of how these different and internally 
diverse religious traditions have become distinct social and institutional reali-
ties. It also exposes a complicated history of religious difference-cum-inequality 
in the country in which hierarchies and dynamics of marginalization between 
and within the two religions are not always unequivocal—for example, with 
regard to the prominent position of a Muslim (i.e., the Gülen-inspired) school 
network in the annual school rankings, or the MoHA’s reluctance to register 
new Pentecostal organizations after 1999. Furthermore, state representatives 
are struggling with uncertainties, too, when they attempt to ‘order’ religious 
instruction in public and private schools. 
In all these regards, the comparative perspective highlights the open-end-
edness of such governing processes, as well as the necessity to address the 
dynamics of mis/trust and ambivalence and how they are experienced and 
enacted in everyday life-worlds. Taken together, these various dynamics will 
certainly affect the outcomes of ‘ordering’ in the future. The comparative 
approach also points to the significant potential that the study of religious mul-
tiplicity has with regard to the analysis of individual experiences and practices 
as well as the ordering of religious public presences on different political and 
institutional levels. By taking diverging religious positionings in public settings 
as entry points “to understand the social world at large” (Altglas and Wood 
2018: 27), we can arrive at a broad understanding of “lived religions” (Soares 
2016: 691) in their mutual entwinement with societal and political processes of 
power and inequality in an interconnected world.
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Notes
 1. Muslim revivalist groups in Tanzania differentiate themselves from BAKWATA, 
the National Muslim Council of Tanzania (see below), and include reform-
oriented Ansar al-Sunna groups (Loimeier 2007: 143).
 2. In Tanzania, Christianity and Islam—along with the omnipresent ‘traditional’ 
religions—are estimated to represent a third of the population each, although 
these numbers are contested. 
 3. For the colonial histories of Christian-Muslim encounters and socio-religious 
inequalities in contemporary Tanzania, see Dilger (2013, 2014).
 4. For the area of HIV/AIDS, see Dilger (2009: 92–93). While Christian organiza-
tions benefited more from the increasingly available funds, there were also 
attempts by international development actors to involve Muslim organizations 
like BAKWATA in the fight against the epidemic.
 5. In 2010, Christian schools represented 41.5 percent of Tanzania’s 200 top-per-
forming secondary schools, whereas Islamic schools represented only 3.5 per-
cent. Christian and Islamic schools constitute 9 to 20 percent of all secondary 
schools in the country, with significantly fewer Islamic than Christian schools.
 6. The EAMWS was established in 1945 and offered social services especially for 
Muslims of ‘Asian origin’.
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